All Pacific countries have a stake in protecting the stability and security of the region. Members of the Pacific Islands Forum, including Australia, agreed in the Boe Declaration 2018 to address regional security challenges collectively. A bilateral agreement such as the one proposed between China and the Solomon Islands undermines this sentiment and shows a limited appreciation for the security of the region as a whole by whoever was the original author of the leaked plan. The ambitious scope of this draft agreement is further evidence of China’s strategic intent in the Pacific. Whether China will eventually be able to establish a permanent military base in the Solomon Islands is not yet certain – if nothing else, this is the first step by many towards such a goal. The leaked document is an early draft and the Solomon Islands will no doubt seek to limit the terms of the agreement, setting aside some of the commitments proposed by China. The Solomon Islands’ growing ties with China following the transition of diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China in 2019 remain an extremely sensitive issue at home. The civil unrest that broke out in November 2021 in Honiara was triggered, in part, by the change, although the underlying factors of the unrest are domestic and not geopolitical. Prolonged provincial rivalries, deep economic problems, concerns about the country’s growing ties with China – of which Solomon’s Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare was seen as the main supporter – and a latent anti-Asian sentiment in the violence and destruction targeting the Chinatown area of Honiara. Four lives were lost and more than 70 businesses were destroyed. When the unrest broke out, Sogavare called for urgent help from Australia, which was able to develop an emergency response within 24 hours through an existing bilateral security agreement that is much more restrictive than China wants to secure. Papua New Guinea, Fiji and New Zealand also sent staff. This was a regional response to a regional problem and is now referred to as the Solomons International Relief Force. Australia has announced that it will extend this presence until December 2023. But targeting Chinese nationals during the riots also provided a reason for the Chinese government’s contribution to security in Honiara. Since then, China has sent police liaisons to train the Solomon Islands’s police force in public order, as well as anti-riot equipment. The growing Chinese security presence has preoccupied Australian officials and questions remain about how to engage in Australian police support programs for decades. More recently, a Solomon Islands newspaper reported that a large cache of Chinese replicas of assault rifles had allegedly been brought into the country on a logging overnight. This sparked a flurry of speculation on social media about their true purpose and a statement from Solomon Islands police that they would investigate how the story came about. Opposition politicians have questioned how far China’s security cooperation with the Solomon Islands will go. This draft agreement provides an indication. But the terms have not yet been finalized. The signing of a security agreement with China that could spark perceptions of violations of Solomon Islands sovereignty will contribute to internal instability at a time when the issues behind last year’s unrest have not yet been resolved. It would also cause concern among other Pacific countries, not just Australia. A document that could overly accommodate the reach of China’s security apparatus in the Solomon Islands would be politically damaging to Prime Minister Sogavare, who will be charged with arresting elites in the wake of the recent unrest. The Solomon Islands’ decision to change their diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China was met with strong political opposition in the national parliament and criticism from the Malaita provincial authorities, who sought to maintain ties with Taiwan. The fact that this agreement was leaked by an adviser to the Prime Minister of Malaytan Daniel Suidani and a few days before Solomon’s parliament is to meet again, is indicative. Sogavare said at the time that moving to China would bring more economic benefits to the Solomon Islands than if the country had maintained its ties with Taiwan. Since the change, Sogavare has tried to prove to the people of Solomon Islands that the benefits are coming – he is under pressure to pay back after pushing the decision in 2019 with few perceived benefits beyond those already provided by Taiwan. The scope of the agreement allows China to provide security assistance to major projects. As more than 90% of Solomon Islands’s mining resources go to China in 2019 and a number of major infrastructure projects promised by Chinese state-owned companies in the country, such an agreement could be linked to Sogavare’s effort to deliver on its promise. increased economic benefits to the Solomon Islands from the transition. The regional order is changing rapidly and will look very different over the next 10 years. It will have more people. Australia cannot, and does not expect, to be the only security partner for the Pacific. But an increased security presence of a country like China in the Pacific further escalates geopolitical competition in the region. The potentially zero-sum rivalry of the major powers in the Pacific does not adequately address the welfare needs of individual Pacific nations and may undermine their security and stability, especially those with a recent history of internal conflict, such as the Solomon Islands. Australia needs to be realistic about China’s increased security presence in the Pacific. The challenge for Canberra policymakers will be how to respond to an increasingly peaceful Pacific without escalating geopolitical tensions in the region. Australia should continue to focus on providing security support that protects the sovereignty of the Pacific countries, is transparent and meets the human security priorities set by the Pacific countries.
