Sign up now for FREE unlimited access to Reuters.com Register SEOUL, March 28 (Reuters) – Reports say North Korea’s biggest missile test may never have been what it seemed, raising new questions about the secret country’s banned weapons program. North Korea said it had tested the new Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) on Thursday, the first test of its size since 2017. North Korean state media announced the launch as an “unprecedented miracle” and South Korean and Japanese officials confirmed independent flight data showing it flew higher and higher than any previous test. read more Sign up now for FREE unlimited access to Reuters.com Register But new details – including the discrepancies found in the highly stylized video of the North with leader Kim Jong Un overseeing the launch with a leather jacket and sunglasses – have opened holes in Pyongyang’s claims. read more “The biggest question now is what was released on March 24,” said Colin Zwirko, senior analyst at NK Pro, a Seoul-based website that tracks North Korea. He looked at commercial satellite imagery and footage released by state media and said that differences in weather, sunlight and other factors suggested that the North Korean launch was another day. “I could tell there was some kind of deception going on, but the question remains: did they try another Hwasong-17 and just not show us or did they try something else?” said Zvirko. The U.S.-based Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) concluded that some of North Korea’s plans were most likely from a March 16 morning test that South Korea said failed shortly after launch, and exploded in mid-air. over Pyongyang. North Korea has never acknowledged this launch or failure. South Korean news agency Yonhap quoted unnamed sources as saying that intelligence officials in Seoul and Washington believed that North Korea had subsequently tested an ICBM Hwasong-15 on Thursday, an older and slightly smaller version of its 2017 counterpart. The South Korean Ministry of Defense has not confirmed this conclusion. On Friday, a senior U.S. defense official, speaking on condition of anonymity, was disgusted when asked if the latest launch was indeed the new missile. “We know this is a test of a long-range ballistic missile and they are clearly trying to learn from each of these tests in order to try to further develop their capabilities,” the official said. “But I will avoid talking too much about it, as we are still analyzing our own intelligence in it.” North Korea has a history of video editing or reusing old images, but it would be “a whole new level” if they lied about successfully testing a major new weapon like the Hwasong-17, Zwirko said. North Korea has not responded to any external reports that the launch may have been misleading. “I think it is possible that the March 16 launch was intended to be the inaugural launch of Hwasong-17, but it failed shortly after ignition,” said Ankit Panda, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “That left the North Koreans with enough videos and images to build a propaganda narrative after the success of the March 24 launch.” The March 24 rocket may have had a light payload or none at all, to achieve greater altitude and longer flight time than the 2017 Hwasong-15 test, he added. “The North Korean state media report included specific figures on how high and far the rocket flew, indicating that there was an intention to build a launch that would look like a larger rocket than the Hwasong-15, even if it was not.” said Panda. Hong Min, director of the North Korea’s research department at the Korea National Unification Institute in Seoul, said that no matter which ICBM was tested, North Korea has shown that it can launch missiles that can hit the far side of the planet. “We will need to check thoroughly if the video was made, but it is not that the threat has been reduced at all,” Hong said. Sign up now for FREE unlimited access to Reuters.com Register Report by Josh Smith. Additional references by Phil Stewart in Washington and Heejung Jung in Seoul. Edited by Gerry Doyle Our role models: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.
