The final report on the deadly derailment of the CP Rail Train 301 near Field, British Columbia, on February 4, 2019, was presented by the Transport Safety Council of Canada (TSB) on Thursday. The findings document a series of profit-based decisions and failures to respond to warnings leading to only one possible conclusion: CP Rail is responsible for the deaths of Dylan Paradis, engineer Andrew Dockrell and trainee Daniel Waldenberger. Bulmer. The report, more than three years in the making and long overdue due to the CP’s efforts to undermine the investigation, sought to explain to the victims’ families, employees and the public exactly what happened that day. He also made recommendations to Transport Canada with the aim of “making it safer to operate trains for cold weather across the mountain rail area”.

The derailment

Dan Holbrook, Director of TSB and Western Rail Operations, gave a detailed account of the events leading up to the accident. Train 301 departed from Calgary around 2:30 p.m. on February 3, 2019. Its route was along the CP West Rail Main Line to Vancouver, which includes “crossing mountains with steep slopes and curves,” Holbrooke said. “Before leaving Calgary the train underwent and passed the required air braking test. The train was operating at extremely low temperatures below -25 Celsius. “ Remote controlled locomotive power distribution on the middle train from the derailed CP Rail Train 301 (Credit: Transportation Safety Board) “Around 9:30 p.m., the train began its descent 13.5 miles down Field Hill,” he continued. “When the whole train entered the steepest part of the grade, it was not able to keep its speed below or below the speed limit of 15 mph. When the speed reached 21 mph, the crew applied the emergency brakes as required by the railway operating procedures. “The train stopped at Partridge around 9:50 p.m. with about 9 miles of mountain range remaining before the Field. After the train was stopped, it was decided to adjust the brake cylinder pressure relief valves in 84 of the 112 cars, instead of holding the valves and parking brakes. “This would make it easier for the train to start by releasing the brakes and allowing the train brake system to recharge as the train continued to descend, a function called release and capture.” The crew had reached the end of their shift, so an aid crew consisting of Paradis, Dockrell and Waldenberger-Bulmer was called in. : 45 p.m. “The temperature was -28 degrees Celsius,” Holbrooke confirmed. A tracked vehicle transported the crew to the train. However, Holbrooke explained that “delays, including an icy circuit breaker, meant they did not arrive on the train until 12:20 p.m. “All the while, the air brake train system had a brake cylinder pressure leak, reducing its ability to hold the train to a stop.” Holbrooke then explained how the derailment occurred: “The relief crew took over and were preparing to continue the journey when the train started crawling around around 12:42 am. much faster than the maximum speed allowed for this part of the track. “At this speed, the train was not able to negotiate the steep 9.8 degree curve just before the Kicking Horse River Bridge. “Two locomotives and 99 cars were derailed and all 3 members of the relief crew were fatally injured.”

Corporate negligence and non-existent regulation

The events that led to the Field derailment provide a devastating charge for what is known in the industry as Precision Rail Scheduling (PSR).  Summarizing this corporate policy, which has been adopted on railroads across North America, a CP Rail employee told PSR in a recent WSWS interview, “The basic idea is that they expect the greatest amount of work with the fewest people possible. resources. “

Field Hill is one of the most dangerous racetracks in Canada. Numerous derailments have taken place there. In March 2021, an intermodal car from a CP freight train derailed in the Field. In January of that year, a grain train derailed 6.5 miles west of Field, temporarily cutting off power to the city. No injuries were reported in either case. As a result of the danger posed by the steep section of the line, CP Rail previously applied a rule according to which no train should be allowed to descend on the Field Hill when the temperature dropped below -25 degrees Celsius. This policy was due to the well-known fact that the brakes prove to be less effective in extremely cold weather. In response to a reporter’s question at Thursday’s press conference, TSB confirmed that CP Rail abandoned this policy after the 2015–16 season, without giving any explanation as to why. The board found that common problems such as brake failure at low temperatures had been “normalized” by CP Rail and that many reports had been submitted by the crews on the terrestrial hazards each year, however “no risk assessment and inadequate remedial measures were carried out are taken. “ Shockingly, the researchers also revealed that the day before his death, Dockrell boarded the same section of the line on a grain train at similar low temperatures and was forced to use the maximum available braking power. He had completed a hazard report for the dangerous railway line, but was unable to submit it electronically due to a power outage in the bunk. A paper copy was found at the crash site. The investigation found that earlier on the 301 train journey from Calgary and shortly before the emergency stop at Partridge Station, there was an increased demand for air from the locomotives after the brakes were applied. Although this remark was discussed during a job briefing after the emergency stop at Partridge, it was not recognized as problematic at the time. One of the main reasons for this decision was the insufficient experience of the train master, whose “training and experience did not adequately prepare him to assess the circumstances or the decisions he was assigned to make”, TSB found. Many mainstream media reports jumped on this finding to portray the unknown train master, instead of CP Rail, as the problem. But as one former CP Rail employee explained on the World Socialist Web site, the company knowingly places poorly trained people in these office positions. “A lot of junior employees who have finished their maestro training are placed in these office jobs instead of kids who have been out there for 40 years and have seen it all,” he said. “They have done everything, they have seen strange things. But these green employees have no real world experience. Then they are placed in administrative positions and can not even put the parking brake. It’s so frustrating. But if you came back with a different approach, you would be over 99% of the time. So instead of listening to an engineer or conductor with 30 years of experience, you should listen to a guy with just one year on his belt. “These guys in the Field were in a losing-losing situation.” The employee added, “I will give credit to the crew in this subdivision. They knew what to do. If something was not right, they would bring it to the administration. But many times they just tell you, ‘Bring the train down the hill, we have to get this train off. We do not want to hear your excuses. “ TSB President Kathy Fox noted that automatic braking technology has been cheap and has been around for a decade, but has not been widely embraced by railway companies. He advocated their use as an “alternative” to handbrakes that would improve safety as well as “take much less time to apply”. No demand for these more basic security measures has been introduced by the Liberal government led by Prime Minister Justin Trinto. The board outlined three recommendations to Transport Canada: improved test standards and time-based maintenance for freight roller brakes operating at steep falls at low ambient temperatures. the installation of automatic parking brakes on freight cars, giving priority to those used on bulk freight trains in mountainous terrain; and, CP Rail to demonstrate to Transport Canada that it can effectively identify hazards and assess and mitigate hazards; using all available information. These recommendations are another empty gesture by a toothless guard to allow the continued speculation of self-regulating railways. As Fox was quick to point out early in the press conference, “The TSB does not impose, assign, or impose criminal or civil liability.” The recommendations themselves are not binding, as it is up to Transport Canada, a federal government department, to lay down rules for railway operators. Even so, CP Rail responded furiously to the recommendations. His official announcement denounced TSB’s findings in various ways as “extremely disappointing”, “inappropriate” and “falsified”. The general response to the TSB’s recommendations is silence. Braking problems have been on the dashboard radar for decades. In its own admission, Fox stated that “unplanned and uncontrolled travel has been a concern for many years” and that 189 such incidents were reported to the TSB between 2010 and 2019. In 2013, a parked train carrying many oil tankers began moving on its own and derailed in Quebec’s Lac-Mégantic, killing 47 people and cremating the city’s core. Only then the …