Because globalization – the conditions, processes and structures that have made the world more complex, interconnected and interdependent – is a product of political choices. These options, such as the regulation and deregulation of labor markets, the regulation and taxation of capital, and the conditions under which countries traded with each other, determined not only that globalization was proceeding rapidly, but also its nature. change it brought about. Trade in industrial products was liberalized, while services were protected. Trade agreements with countries that were clearly unaware of the terms – mainly China – were agreed without taking into account their abuse. With domestic policies, some countries did more than others to protect their people from the winds of change and some did more than others to protect their national infrastructure from the prying eyes of hostile states. For a while, everything looked good. We imported cheap clothes and made products. Our borrowing costs and inflation have been curbed by government policies and savers in Asia. House prices have risen and many have felt better about it. But little by little the cost became more apparent. Intermediate work has disappeared. Payments are stationary. As productivity increased, employee returns failed to keep pace with those of investors. As factories closed and manufacturing moved to Asia, the link between the success of British companies and the prosperity of the British was broken: while once executives could share some profits with low- and middle-skilled workers, such workers are now employed. in other countries . Even some of the fruits of globalization are rotting. While the restricted growth of the Chinese economy once kept inflation low, it is now raising it as we compete for scarce resources such as oil and gas. While abandoning processing was considered the pinnacle of modernization, during the pandemic we found that we were exposed without it. While opening up to foreign investment was once our motivation, we now understand that it is being exploited by hostile states to launder dirty money and gain leverage against us. Even now our leaders are reluctant to see the truth. They cling to liberal assumptions that have long been refuted – that our values are universal, that the rest of the world wants to be like us, that interconnection makes war impossible, that trade liberalization inevitably leads to open societies and democratic policies – and hope that events can continue to change their course. The longer this foolish hope continues, the more painful the inevitable change will be and the more our adversaries and enemies will conspire to inflict new blows on us. Russia, if led by Putin or his allies, can not expect a return to normal diplomatic or economic relations. And whether we like it or not, Western countries will soon be forced to secede, perhaps to a different degree, from China. But if this phase of globalization is over, what follows? To answer we must first be honest with ourselves. We do not live, as we often say to ourselves, that we live in a liberal class based on rules. Since the Cold War, we have lived in a US-led class in which US military and economic power has allowed Washington to dominate the world. American hegemony is preferable to anything that can replace it, but we must not delude ourselves that world institutions and structures are in any way just. They are violently advocated and the rules are aimed at protecting American interests. This US-led mandate has not been destroyed, but it is being challenged. America lost its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Through innocence and negligence, he called China to the world trade system and watched Beijing break all rules, dump cheap goods in the West, steal economic and military secrets, and cause deindustrialisation and social disintegration in the rust zone. American political instability, which is repeated elsewhere in the West, is directly linked to the economic and social stress that is fueled in part by globalization. The adversaries and enemies they provoke in us do not seek to export their ideology, to overthrow our system of government, or to destroy our culture. But as China grows stronger, its global interests increase, and with it its security and military interests. As the relative power of the West diminishes, countries such as Russia, Iran and North Korea will become more assertive. The new model, then, must resist and limit our rivals and enemies. It requires the recognition that economic power matters, and therefore the pursuit of growth is not optional. It requires that we prioritize national resilience over the fictitious effectiveness of tight supply chains. It requires economic nationalism, strategic planning and the preservation of domestic production and basic capabilities. It also requires closer cooperation across the West and with allies standing with us. We need new institutions and forums to ensure such cooperation, and coordinated defense and security policies, access to key products such as energy and vital technological capabilities, from chip manufacturing to specialization in areas such as artificial intelligence and telecommunications. We must be prepared for the end of the open, global Internet and a challenge to the dollar as the world’s reserve currency. We will need to accept the reality of spheres of influence and engage in a competition for support, power, trade and access to natural resources in non-aligned countries. We will have to accept that we can not help liberals and democrats in every country, and sometimes ally ourselves with countries that are neither liberal nor democratic. We will need to spend more on defense and security policy and use the combined aid budgets to compete with the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. Inside, we will need to do more to heal the social and economic differences that our enemies want to exploit. There was nothing inevitable about the globalization of the last three decades. Indeed, we are now nearing the end of it. But our security, prosperity and freedom depend on shaping what follows.
