Putin waited, finally launching an invasion on February 24. But China has not been involved in Putin’s war in Ukraine, despite Chinese President Xi Jinping and Putin saying “there are no limits” to their friendship. Instead, the Chinese government tried to follow a cautious line. He has not condemned the Russian invasion. But while China has criticized Western sanctions on Russia, it has not really moved to help Russia avoid them, and it seems to be trying to avoid sanctions. At the same time, what he says and does externally can be very different from what happens behind the scenes. Maria Repnikova, an assistant professor of global communications at Georgia State University, said the relationship between Moscow and Beijing was a little more symbolic than practical. “At the level of rhetoric and symbolism and common visions for the world, there seems to be some agreement,” he said. But for now, China is mainly trying to hover on the sidelines of these geopolitical tensions. Repnikova, who studies communications and comparisons between Russia and China, said China’s delicate position is reflected in its state media, where Ukraine does not dominate news coverage, at least not as much as domestic issues. What is in the state media and on social media tends to show sympathy for the Russian position – as in Russia, the invasion is not really referred to as war – and a dislike for the United States and the West, which is largely blamed for the conflict. “The pro-Russian [sentiment] “It is often portrayed as the wider critique of the West – so it is difficult to say how much of it is pro-Russian, how much it is actually anti-US or whether it is merged.” One thing is clear: Between the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and this war in 2022, “there are more anti-American sentiments than in the past.” However, Repnikova stressed that it is really difficult to have a complete picture of views in China. There are conflicting voices and alternative perspectives within China, but they often find it difficult to maintain this conversation, especially on the internet, due to censorship. “There is a temptation to say that everyone in China believes this or that they are all subject to propaganda,” Repnikova said. “But there are two reservations there: One is that, yes, there are alternative voices, but they just have a hard time surviving. “The other warning is that there is organic, bottom-up nationalism in China that is not necessarily dictated by the state alone.” Both the official government line and what is available on the Internet offer a glimpse of Beijing’s cautious stance in recent weeks – and what it can do as the war continues. The conversation with Repnikova, edited and condensed for the sake of clarity, is below.
Jen Kirby
As we can say, how does China view the war in Ukraine?
Maria Repnikova
Well, it’s hard to know exactly how, because they are not very transparent about his inner feelings [Chinese Communist Party (CCP)]. As for the way in which it promotes its policies and prospects, it seems to see its own role to remain on the sidelines and to constantly reassure the external public that they are in favor of peace and want to promote dialogue. But overall, they have not been so active so far – at least from what we see in public, in terms of ending this war or pushing Russia to stop its invasion. If [the Chinese government] sees the war in Ukraine as positive or negative, I think, on the whole, it is rather more than the negative side, because it is a total disruption to world economic flows and grain imports, of China’s own wheat from Ukraine – and from Russia, undoubtedly, too. It is also linked to possible consequences for itself if it ends up bypassing Western sanctions in some way and engaging with Russia in a way that is seen as saving Russia or boosting its economic activities despite the sanctions. Therefore, I think that overall, it is considered another external crisis that the CCP has to face, while it is facing a Covid epidemic inside China and with a big party congress coming in September, so a lot is happening inside. I think so [the war in Ukraine] is considered as a very important crisis to be managed externally, but also vis-.-vis the domestic public.
Jen Kirby
This may be a question that is difficult to answer, but is there a sense that the Chinese government is surprised by how the West has responded to the Russian invasion, especially when it comes to sanctions sanctions?
Maria Repnikova
Again, it is difficult to know if they are surprised because there is no way to prove it. But in general, I think they are concerned about this answer because it shows the extent of the possibility of unity and common defense and restrictions, the real practical measures taken against Russia. From what I have seen, in some of the discussions in the Chinese state media and in popular sentiment, there is some discussion about “How is China preventing this from happening?” or “How to create more caching policies or systems so that we are less dependent on the West or less prone to similar attacks or similar isolation.” Overall, there is a sense of a warning story as well as a kind of learning experience.
Jen Kirby
Mention the state media. Is there a general issue or issues with the way it covers the conflict in Ukraine?
Maria Repnikova
First of all, the war was not so widely covered in the Chinese state media for the domestic public. CGTN, a television station aimed at an external, global audience, has covered it quite extensively. But in the domestic media, you often see stories being buried among other internal affairs stories. If you open the People’s Daily, the newspaper that is the main spokesman [of the CCP], you mainly see Xi Jinping’s political speeches, all sorts of other topics. But Ukraine is somewhere at the bottom. It is less obscured or somewhat confused in other stories. This is an issue. The other issue is that we see very careful rhetoric, but not Russia’s direct responsibilities. We do not call it an invasion. I do not think he even invokes war, mainly “military operation”. We see a lot of language or rhetoric about the war bordering on Russian rhetoric, so a little bit of that kind of penetration or diffusion of Russian statements and sources. This is another thing I have noticed. The other big issue on social media, but also in some state media, and the issue that is emerging from Chinese diplomats, is this NATO and US accusation of war. So instead of saying, “Well, how does the conflict come about, Ukraine or Russia?” Who started it and why? ” “Well, that was almost inevitable because of how much NATO has militarized the region. “And the United States, of course, as a key member of NATO, has basically provoked this war.” So many anti-Western, anti-American sentiments or explanations for war, as opposed to blaming, say, Russia or even Ukraine. This is another thing that has remained fairly consistent in different statements and coverage and media.
Jen Kirby
Do you see these feelings being reflected more organically on social media? I know the internet is tightly controlled, but what do we know about how the public responds to the war in Ukraine?
Maria Repnikova
It was a hot topic for a while. In recent days, it has changed due to the plane crash and other issues have begun to take precedence. But the very strong emotion is that of nationalism, anti-Americanism, anti-Western sentiment – and quite pro-Russian sentiment. But as I argued in the Atlantic, the pro-Russian [sentiment] is often covered as this wider critique of the West – so it is difficult to say how many of them are pro-Russian, how many of them are actually anti-US or whether they are merged. We see some questioning voices. It is not completely controllable. We see some fact-checkers appear who control the way stories are reported in some Chinese state media and question their sources or question the perspectives they adopt. There are subtle repulsive attempts. Some academics have signed petitions expressing their solidarity with Ukraine. We have also seen some voices of Chinese nationals in Ukraine saying things from there or expressing their feelings, which are very different from the state media. There are some alternative sources of information or frameworks, but many have been censored.
Jen Kirby
Is there anything unusual that bothers you about the debate over Ukraine?
Maria Repnikova
Well, the difference between the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and this war in 2022, is that there are more anti-American sentiments than in the past, when they were not so clearly anti-American. This is a turning point that may reflect the state of US-China relations, but also more domestic domestic pride in what China has accomplished, how it has handled Covid. there are many other factors and facts. So this is a small change. It also depends on how sensitive the story is, and I think that story is a bit sensitive, in part because how Russia is covered has been a long, sensitive issue. The state media, from my research, I saw that they are not really allowed to criticize or comment on Russia in a critical way, such as reporting protest movements in Russia or movements that try to derail or weaken Putin. You do not really see these stories coming out in the Chinese media.
Jen Kirby
You mentioned that the coverage by the Chinese media for …
